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Between the 1960s and 1980s, global land dedicated to monocultures for biofuels 
tripled and continues to increase (Gerber, 2011). While biofuels are considered sustainable 
alternatives to their nonrenewable counterparts (Pye, 2018), concerns have been raised 
regarding their environmental impact. Some of these crops, such as soybeans and corn, are 
known as flex crops, or crops with uses extending beyond the fuel industry and into food and 
other sectors. Another such crop is African or oil palm (Elaeis guineensis). Palm oil in its various 
forms is found virtually everywhere, extending from biodiesel blends to food and household 
items. Plantations have spread expanded from southeast Asia to Latin America in recent years. 
However, studies have shown that the expansion of oil palm plantations in the Global South has 
contributed to extensive environmental degradation through deforestation, disease and pest 
introduction, and extractive monocultures (Alfonso & Liliana, 2011; Delgado, 2013; Selfa et al., 
2015; Vijay et al, 2016; Castañheira & Freire, 2017).  
 
This project builds on existing literature discussing the relationship between the growing 
palm industry in Colombia, one of the top palm oil producing countries in the world, armed 
conflict, and United States interventions through foreign aid, as the phenomenon may have 
broader implications for food security and violence. To accomplish this, I use secondary 
Colombian agricultural census data, USAID disbursement data, and estimated displacement 
data to determine whether the implementation of Plan Colombia exacerbated conflict affected 
violence, palm oil hectarage, and increased United States interventions in Colombia. Compiling 
this information to plot trends over time in addition to conducting a single factor ANOVA for 
each factor showed that the six-years during which Plan Colombia occurred dramatically 
increased annual rates of displacement and established significant growth in palm oil hectarage 
countrywide. Additionally, I delve into the current peace process in Colombia, as the impacts of 
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Currently, Indonesia and Malaysia produce the bulk of palm oil consumed worldwide. 
However, in response to global demand for the product plantations have expanded quickly in 
Latin America over the last two decades (Bennett et. al, 2018). The oil palm industry now spans 
the coastal rural landscapes of Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil (Delgado & Dietz, 2013). Land 
converted to oil palm plantations more than doubled between 2000 and 2018, with Colombia 
and Peru experiencing the most rapid growth (Bennet et. al, 2018). This process followed a 
period of agrarian reform in Latin America from the 1960s to 1980s characterized by greater 
participation in a global marketplace through the expansion of exports (Kay, 2015). 
Corporations and governments established a series of neoliberal plans and development 
projects designed to both expand the area of production to Latin America and foster 
international economic partnerships (Kay, 2015; Bennet et. al, 2018). However, much of this 
development came at the cost of deforestation and land loss for rural and indigenous peoples 
(Kay, 2015; Bennet et. al, 2018). In some cases, companies convince community members to 
welcome them by providing resources otherwise neglected by national governments. These 
come either in the form of financial support and public services, or inputs for smallholder 
production to be shifted away from other crops in favor of palm oil (Bennet et. al, 2018).  
Colombia has uniquely experienced the appropriation of land and resources through a 
national armed conflict that has lasted over half a century. Forced displacement at the hands of 




“abandoned” farmland and forests to plantations. Interestingly, a major uptick in hectarage 
devoted to oil palm plantations in Colombia coincided with the USAID foreign aid program Plan 
Colombia, which mainly operated from 2000-2006. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the relationships between palm oil, armed 
conflict, and the USAID Plan Colombia. Colombia provides an important case for analysis 
because its palm oil industry is associated uniquely with armed conflict exacerbated by 
neoliberal foreign policies. It is a unitary republic, which consists of a state governed by a single 
central government located in the country’s capital, Bogota. Unlike the United States, in which 
individual states have a level of sovereignty. Colombia is made up of 32 departments with 
respective governors who do not operate independently of the state. Each of these are further 
divide into municipalities. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
“Colombia is considered a middle-income country with a democratic tradition and relatively 
strong institutions at the national level, [but] weak presence in many rural areas of the country” 
(UNHCR, 2006). This results in areas neglected by the state and makes them vulnerable to, in 
this case, hostile takeover by illegal armed forces. I argue that Plan Colombia influenced the 
palm oil industry “boom” that occurred in the 2000s while exacerbating the effects of armed 
conflict by way of forced displacement in Colombia.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
 The exploitation of nature for human benefit and as a method of establishing power is a 
key part of liberalism, laying the foundation for modern day neoliberalism. In his Second 




man by God, essentially providing a Divine right for its use “to the best advantage of life and 
convenience” (Locke et al., 2003: 111), or that nature itself holds no inherent value and must be 
“improved” through human labor to have value. In doing so, humans can claim ownership over 
land and resources, and applying labor to modify land or make use of raw materials is a basic 
form of claiming or creating private property. According to Locke, social order is created and 
maintained through private property and control over resources (Locke et al., 2003). This 
notion is not unique to Locke, however, and is used to justify the neoliberalization of nature we 
have increasingly witnessed in recent decades. Land continues to be viewed through a 
monetary lens and its ecosystem services1, are subjected to assignments of value (Castaño, 
2018). In short, assigning value to land and its natural processes imposes economic and political 
control and power over territories.  
Neoliberalism is a political project that draws from the more traditional economic liberal 
notion and emphasizes the concepts of private property or privatization, free trade, free 
markets, and globalization (Harvey, 2003). Part of the globalization process is the cooperation 
between policymakers and transnational corporate elites (Avilés, 2008). Transnational 
corporations (TNCs) further their advancement by lobbying states and creating policy networks 
to establish and maintain control in areas of interest worldwide (Avilés, 2008), thus exercising 
and expanding political and economic power in a global market. Neoliberalism began to gain 
traction as a hegemonic ideological project through policies from major leaders such as Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s and is now deeply embedded in modern forms of 
 
1 Life-sustaining benefits to humans produced by the natural environment, such as water filtration and air 




capitalist accumulation (Harvey, 2003). Neoliberal policies practices emerged around 1980 as 
the development plan developed and implemented at Bretton Woods with the post-war 
establishment of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs did not produce the widespread rise in incomes anticipated in the lower 
income countries. Rather, most countries accumulated huge debts with no growth and simply 
borrowed funds to pay interest. A new regime came into being during this time with much less 
flexibility allowed by borrowing countries through the mechanism of Structural Adjustment 
Programs. To service debt and fund state activities, national governments were required to 
cede decision-making control to international financial institutions (McMichael, 1996; Steger 
and Roy, 2010). 
Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation provides a foundational understanding of 
accumulation in a neoliberal regime. The process is characterized by commodification, 
privatization, displacement, and the seizure of common goods and spaces for private property 
rights (Harvey, 2003). The accumulation of capital itself cannot be perpetuated internally, 
however. The issue of overaccumulation, or “the lack of opportunities for profitable 
investment” (Harvey, 2003: 139) is a constant pressure on the capitalist system. Simply put, it is 
the point at which the continued reinvestment of surplus capital can reach a point where there 
is little to no return on investment. To circumvent overaccumulation, the capitalist can expand 
to new spaces or open new markets to generate both investment and consumer demand 
(Harvey, 2003). Currently, this occurs when actors in the Global North impose trade agreements 
on the Global South, allowing for capital accumulation through access to cheap labor and land 




creating a cycle of expansion and exploitation through trade agreements and a growing global 
market. This epitomizes the need for capitalism to rely on “solutions external to itself” (Harvey, 
2003) to remain stable. 
The most widely used method of external expansion to fuel accumulation is 
accumulation by dispossession (ABD) (Harvey, 2003), a process in which neoliberal capitalist 
policies accrue capital in the hands of powerful entities (such as corporations) through the 
displacement of people from land they occupied previously. Dispossession in this case refers to 
the restriction or removal of access to resources like land, water, or food, as well as the 
removal of property rights (Harvey, 2002; Cáceres, 2015). It can be facilitated through 
potentially violent forceful eviction or land tenure disputes involving titles and incentives 
(Harvey, 2003; Cáceres, 2015; Castaño, 2018). In addition, “crises may be orchestrated, 
managed, and controlled to rationalize the system” (Harvey, 2003: 150). This is crucial for 
establishing the biofuel industry under the guise of rural development. Harvey suggests that 
government-supported credit systems are used as tools for ABD (2003). In a review of land 
grabs in Latin America, Borras et. al (2012) describe the lucrative mechanisms and discourses 
used to facilitate land grabs. They state that “the key mechanisms of land grabbing arise from 
this: food security, energy/fuel security, climate change mitigation strategies, and demands for 
natural resources by new centres of capital” (Borras et. al, 2012: 851). 
These methods make up what Marin-Burgos & Clancy (2017) refer to as the expansion 
of commodity frontiers. A commodity frontier is zone beyond which commodity production will 
expand its level (Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017). This occurs through processes such as 




production to meet or create new demands (Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017). However, it is 
important to note that each commodity frontier will experience these changes very differently, 
as each locale comes with its own specific set of socioeconomic, political, and environmental 
dynamics which will affect the ways in which communities are impacted. For our purposes, I will 
be focusing on what this looks like in the palm oil industry, which is very land intensive. 
The ABD or commodity frontier expansion for biofuel expansion begins with export 
states working in tandem with multinational corporations to implement the neoliberalization of 
nature (Bakker, 2015), or the “process of reforms and ideological transformations that [seeks 
to] implement the doctrine of neoliberalism, [which includes] privatization, marketization, 
deregulation, and reregulation” (Bakker, 2015: 447). Privatization, or the shift from public to 
private ownership of land, is a crucial step in the neoliberalization process (Fairhead et. al, 
2012). These initiatives expand the control of transnational corporations (TNCs) over regions 
with renewable and nonrenewable resources, as well as ecosystem services. These once 
publicly accessible assets are assigned monetary value, and consequently commodified as their 
production and commercial exchange are now additional sources of income for TNCs and the 
State, a process of capitalist accumulation known as the neoliberalization of nature (Harvey, 
2005; Bakker, 2015). With the rise of neoliberal policies pushed by corporations in the Global 
North, the 1990s witnessed an expansion of privatization and marketization of property rights 
in Latin America (Liverman & Vilas, 2006).  
Socioenvironmental conflict often results directly from these actions and is experienced 
disproportionately in marginalized communities. It is especially serious in the case of natural 




with extractive development projects. Scarcity is a major driver of conflict because it results in 
unequal access and power dynamics (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Castaño, 2018). This engenders 
environmental racism by targeting marginalized groups with insufficient power to retaliate 
(Bullard & Clinton, 1994). Rural communities which rely on agriculture and traditional foodways 
are heavily impacted. Dispossession disrupts local activities and practices of food sovereignty as 
well as local markets (Castaño, 2018). 
Moreover, the expansion of commodity frontiers also contributes to changes in the 
ecological landscape and biodiversity (Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017). It is not uncommon for 
disputes over land to develop, as some dynamics may include the exclusion of people through 
legal, illegal, and violent forms of claiming control over land (Peluso & Lund, 2011). These 
efforts often operate in the name of development, but are cases where “authorities, 
sovereignties, and hegemonies of the recent past have been or are currently being challenged 
by new enclosures, territorializations, and property regimes” (Peluso & Lund, 2011: 668). In 
other words, lands once managed by those who have historically lived there under traditional 
rights, often not officially documented, were acquired through violent measures or 
manipulative agreements, resulting in widespread displacement. Access to natural resources is 
revoked and management of privatized land is now up to the discretion of corporations, which 
is often supported by the state. Corporate ownership now creates a system in which production 
is up to the discretion of multinational actors and used as a tool for profit with little regard for 
the ecosystem and the people who once lived there.   
While companies and states use a range of mechanisms to make land available for 




(Harvey, 2003). Regardless of the method, dispossession makes way for a private company to 
establish either a mining site (in the case of fossil fuels) or a biofuel plantation. Biofuels provide 
a critical opportunity to curb the detrimental effects of fossil fuel operations and have grown in 
popularity as sustainable and more environmentally conscious sources of fuel. Unlike fossil 
fuels, biofuels are derived from living material such as plants. Popular biofuel crops include 
soybean, sugar cane, palm oil, and corn. However, the demand for plant-based fuels across the 
globe has skyrocketed, particularly in the transportation sector which has relied heavily on 
nonrenewable resources (Castiblanco et. al, 2013; Paterson & Lima, 2018). Biofuels provide an 
alternative to fossil fuels and may produce lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 
comparison. Supplying global demand for biomass or for biofuel requires significant plant 
material, and production and extraction processes involve intensive land use. Much of the land 
best suited for these operations is often already inhabited or provides public resources like 
drinking water and food.  
Nevertheless, as with many commercial operations aiming to meet global demand, 
biofuel expansion has given rise to a newer form of land grabs, called green grabs in which the 
dispossession of land is justified in terms of environmental consciousness. This argument 
assumes that local communities may be mismanaging the land and that a private entity may 
better govern activities or use with more efficient land management practices. It is important to 
recognize that these sentiments are not new and reflect a long history of the removal of agency 
from poor and rural communities (Harvey, 2003; Fairhead et. al, 2012). The term green grab 
focuses on the appropriation of land under the guise, or in pursuit of, eco-friendly or 




way for “more efficient farming to alleviate pressure on forests” (Fairhead et. al, 2012: 238), or 
extracting or developing in one area while leaving other patches of forest intact.  
The Miracle Fruit 
The expansion of extractive projects in agriculture has broadened the use of commodity 
monocultures and “[corresponds] with the emergence of a global agroindustrial complex, called 
the food-feed-fuel complex” (Delgado & Dietz, 2013: 1, personal translation), referring to 
products that can be flexibly used for food, feed, or agrofuels. Crops which are cultivated to 
meet production needs across different sectors in this way are known as flex crops. Borras et. al 
(2012) state:  
 
‘flex crops’: crops that have multiple uses (food, feed, fuel, industrial material) that can 
be easily and flexibly inter-changed: soya (feed, food, biodiesel), sugarcane (food, 
ethanol), oil palm (food, biodiesel, commercial/industrial uses), corn (food, feed, 
ethanol). It has resolved one difficult challenge in agriculture: diversified product 
portfolio to avoid devastating price shocks, but not easy to do and achieve because of 
the cost it entails (Borras, et. al, 2012: 851) 
Palm Oil: Promise and Peril 
The African Palm tree (Elaeis guineensis) (Atinmo & Bakre, 2003) originated in the West 
African tropical rainforest region but is now mass produced for commercial use worldwide. It is 
the highest yielding oil crop, producing ten times more oil per hectare than competitors such as 




Alonso-Fradejas, 2016), which makes it relatively cheap to produce as well. In the past decade, 
palm oil has exceeded soybean oil as the most highly sought oil in the world (Mba et al., 2015). 
After an initial three to five years of growth, African palm trees can produce for up to 
approximately 25 years (Maher, 2015; Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017; Castaño, 2018) and in a 
tropical habitat, E. guineensis promises longer term, continuous production of oil than crops 
which require biomass to be harvested or cut for use. In addition to this, the trees’ high yield 
and minimal labor requirements after planting makes the industry incredibly profitable (Viloria, 
2008; Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017). 
While the term palm oil is widely recognized and will be used for the purposes of this 
project, there are two types of oil extracted from African Palm fruit. The first is generally 
referred to as crude palm oil (CPO) or red palm oil and has been in production since the early 
19th century (Atinmo & Bakre, 2003; Matthäus, 2007; Mba et al., 2015). CPO is extracted from 
the fleshy mesocarp of each fruit, which is up to 55% oil by weight (Atinmo & Bakre, 2003; Mba 
et al., 2015). The name red palm oil is due to its color, which ranges from light yellow to red 
orange as a result of high levels of carotenoids (Manorama & Rukmini, 1992; Atinmo & Bakre, 
2003; Kellens et al., 2007; Mba et al., 2015). It is mostly used for food and biofuels (Paterson & 
Lima, 2018). The remaining kernel inside the fruit is the source palm kernel oil- PKO, which is 
also about 50% oil by weight. Unlike CPO, which is extracted in producing countries and 
exported as product, palm kernels themselves are shipped whole and PKO is extracted in 
importing countries (Paterson & Lima, 2018). This colorless oil remains solid in temperate 




States, corporations, and organizations argue that palm oil is a promising product to use 
in addressing issues of food insecurity, poverty, climate change, and economic and rural 
development (Hunsberger & Alonso-Fradejas, 2016; Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017; Pye 2018). 
African palm’s ability to produce two different types of palm oils with distinct properties has 
earned its designation as a flex crop. Palm oil (both CPO and PKO) is used in food, livestock, 
chemical, cosmetic, and energy sectors, making it an incredibly lucrative and highly sought crop 
(Atinmo & Bakre, 2003; Hunsberger & Alonso-Fradejas, 2016; Vijay et al, 2016; Paterson & 
Lima, 2018; Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017; Pye, 2018).  
 
Food and Nutrition 
Palm oil is commonly known for its myriad of uses in the food sector. In its simplest 
form, palm oil is used as consumable vegetable oil for cooking and serves as an alternative to 
soy and sunflower oil (Hunsberger & Alonso-Fradejas, 2016). Its potential expands through a 
process called fractionation, which separates liquid components, known as palm olein, from 
solid palm stearin through crystallization of the fatty elements (Kellens et al., 2007; Matthäus, 
2007; Mba et al., 2015). Fractionation is different from hydrogenation, which is an irreversible 
process of extracting solid fats that produces trans fats and contributes to health concerns 
associated with them (Kellens et al., 2007; Matthäus, 2007; Mba et al., 2015). 
Products of fractionation, known as fractions, increase the use value of palm oil because 
they have different chemical and physical properties than their source oil, and can be mixed 
with other products (Kellens et al., 2007). For example, palm olein has been blended with 




al., 2007; Mba et al., 2015). Palm stearin, the solid fraction, is considered a healthier edible fat 
option because its ability to function as a solid fat on its own, means that hydrogenation is 
unnecessary, and trans fats are removed from the equation (Benade, 2003; Kellens et al., 2007; 
Matthäus, 2007; Mba et al., 2015). In other cases, oil and fractions have been blended to 
provide edible fat in infant formula and margarine (Mba et al., 2015). Since palm oil’s low costs 
increases its accessibility and utility in making inexpensive products, it has become a more 
affordable option as a frying fat in addition to acting as a food ingredient. In fact, palm oil use 
exceeds the use of beef tallow in industrial frying (Mba et al., 2015).  
In terms of nutrition, studies have shown that palm oil can address widespread vitamin 
A deficiencies. It is high in antioxidants and Beta (b) carotene, which is precursory to vitamin A 
and provides palm oil’s characteristic red color. Though it is commonly used as a colorant in 
food and drink, studies have shown that b carotene can be used as a supplemental alternative 
to Vitamin A, and its consumption of CPO and CPO-based products do not have the same 
detrimental toxicological or nutritional effects brought about by the overconsumption of 
Vitamin A (Manorama & Rukmini, 1992; Benade, 2003; Mba et al., 2015).  
 
Climate Change Mitigation 
In relation to climate change mitigation, proponents of palm oil posit that plantations 
operate as planted forests (Pye, 2018), featuring perennial green biomass and the closed 
canopy that defines a tropical rainforest (MPOC, n.d). When considered this way, plantations 
are claimed to be able to address concerns about GHG emissions through carbon sequestration 




is extracted from biomass, African Palm can produce continuously for roughly 25 years (Maher, 
2015; Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017; Castaño, 2018). While yield generally peaks after seven to 
ten years because it becomes more difficult to harvest as trees grow taller (Mingorance & 
Minelli, 2004; Palacios, 2012), soil does not need to be disturbed during productive years and 
additional carbon is not released into the atmosphere. Mills and refineries are constructed near 
the plantation landscape, allowing processing to happen on site (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017; 
Pye, 2018). With the combined high percentage of oil in fruit by weight, oil palm plantations are 
considered the most efficient models of production (MPOC, n.d; Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017; 
RSPO, 2019).  
 
Environmental Impacts 
Despite these claims, the palm oil industry has come under fire for mirroring the 
extractivist paradigm of capitalist accumulation through appropriation of land, raw materials, 
and the negative effects on local biodiversity and people (Ewing & Msangi, 2009; Carlson et. al 
2012; Edwards & Lawrence, 2012; Castiblanco et. al, 2013; Delgado & Dietz, 2013; Castaño, 
2018). African Palm is cultivated primarily on plantations, which often requires large swathes of 
previously species-rich or fertile landscapes to be replaced with a monoculture. The conversion 
of tropical rainforests to plantations is especially detrimental (Paterson & Lima, 2018). Studies 
have highlighted the substantial release in GHG and volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions 
caused by their establishment because they are released through deforestation (Alfonso & 
Liliana, 2011; Selfa et al., 2015; Vijay et al, 2016; Castañheira & Freire, 2017; Paterson & Lima, 




when forests are cleared (Edwards & Lawrence, 2012) due to the low overall biomass of oil 
palm plantations compared to the forests they replace. Deforestation across Southeast Asia for 
plantations is also known to contribute to forest fires and major biodiversity loss, particularly in 
the case of peatland clearing (Pye, 2018; Paterson & Lima, 2018). Even though there are 
regulations restricting this activity, peatland is still drained illegally to clear the way for 
plantations (Paterson & Lima, 2018; Danielsen et. al, 2019). Danielsen et. al (2019) conclude 
that it would take up to 93 years to compensate for the sheer amount of carbon released from 
forest clearing with biofuel use, and over 600 years in the case of peatland clearing. 
Peat draining and removal produces haze and black smoke, raises surface temperatures 
(Paterson & Lima, 2018; Pye, 2018). Despite the presence of the RSPO, “subtle management of 
monocultures does not prevent the conversion to monocultures” (Pye, 2018: 219) and the 
effects of deforestation project are irreversible. After establishment, plantations’ reliance on 
fertilizers contributes to the release of copious nitrous oxide into the atmosphere (Paterson & 
Lima, 2018).  
 Between 1993 and 2012, global acreage of palm oil plantations expanded to 18 million 
hectares in producing countries (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017). It replaced a staggering 270,000 
hectares of tropical forests per year between 2000 and 2011 in exporting countries (Vijay et al, 
2016), producing about 50 million metric tons per year by 2012 (Paterson & Lima, 2018). 
Continuing expansion into new commodity frontiers will only continue spreading the 
biodiversity and habitat loss documented in southeast Asia to other regions such as Latin 
America (Ocampo-Peñuela et. al, 2018; Paterson & Lima, 2018). In addition to habitat 




been documented in the literature (Vijay et al, 2016; Castanheira & Freire, 2017; Alfonso & 
Liliana, 2011; Selfa et al., 2015; Hamann, 2018).  
These environmental problems have been documented in Malaysia, the world’s second 
largest palm oil producer behind Indonesia. In 2014, palm oil generated approximately $12 
billion USD in exports and accounted for 70 percent of the agricultural landscape (Pye, 2018). In 
a review of the industry in Malaysia, Oliver Pye describes plantations as “an industrial landscape 
of mills, refineries, ad fat-processing and chemical plants” (2018: 218). 
 
Facing Criticism 
Non-state market-driven (NSMDs) governance in flex crop production has developed to 
address these outcomes and to promote sustainability discourse in support of palm oil 
production in response to these socio-environmental critiques. Third party certification 
programs have become a major source of advocacy for ‘ethical’ consumerism through which 
companies can continue to encourage sales that fund more ‘environmentally friendly’ forms of 
production (Bartley, 2015). As more people cast their financial vote in support of these clean or 
ethical products, the resulting wave of “conscientious consumerism” (Bartley, 2015: 31) puts a 
social responsibility on the consumer to force corporations to change business, labor, or 
agricultural practices to meet the demand (Pye, 2018). Additionally, this perpetuates demand 
for a given commodity and justifies further expansion under the guise of ethics.  
The current leading and most widely recognized multi-sectoral organization certifying 
“sustainable” production is the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) (Pye, 2018), which 




campaigns noting palm oil’s contribution to forest fires across Southeast Asia (Pye, 2018), and is 
comprised of stakeholders from various parts of the palm oil industry, from smallholders and 
large corporate producers to retailers and NGOs (MPOC, n.d.; RSPO, n.d.; Silva-Castañeda, 
2012; Vijay et al., 2016). With this range of participants, the organization strives to engage with 
voices beyond that of multinational corporations and provide a platform for those impacted 
directly by the industry.  
Certification for producers is dependent on the following criteria: transparency 
regarding management, natural resource conservation, and assessment of social and 
environmental impacts (MPOC, n.d; RSPO, n.d.; Vijay et al., 2016; Pye, 2018). By 2016, 
approximately 21 percent of global production was RSPO certified (van der Ven et. al, 2018). 
Certification allows corporations producing palm oil or using sustainable palm oil as an 
ingredient in products to be actors in sustainability efforts. By sourcing certified sustainable 
palm oil in food for example, one company may be considered more responsible than 
competitors and appeal to consumers making more “ethical” choices (Pye, 2018). As of June 
2019, there were 3.89 million hectares of certified plantation land across 16 countries (RSPO, 
2019).  
Despite efforts to increase more sustainable production practices, the effectiveness of 
RSPO certifications has been heavily criticized (Castiblaco, 2013; Pye, 2018). The organization 
primarily certifies large corporations over smallholders, and only focuses on individual 
processing plants and plantations (Pye, 2018). Another problem with this approach is that an 
operation may have a certified plantation, but the certification does not include the rest of the 




primary forests, which are regions untouched by human intervention, and those with a ‘High 
Conservation Value’ designation are protected and cannot be cleared for plantation 
development. This leaves secondary growth forests or previously cultivated or disturbed area, 
susceptible to deforestation. This process does little improve the effects of deforestation. 
Instead of a pristine new “forest,” plantations are homogenous landscapes which cause 
ecosystem fragmentation (Castiblanco et al., 2013; Pye, 2018), or the division of natural 
landscapes leading to the reduction of habitat for wildlife. The remaining HCVAs are left with 
substantially lowered biodiversity than the forests that have been replaced (Pye, 2018). Lastly, 
issues of land tenure rights and labor regulations are excluded from criteria (Castiblanco et. al, 
2013; Pye, 2018). 
Van der Ven et. al (2018) analyze the third-party certification programs aimed at 
preventing negative outcomes from palm oil expansion, and they conclude that too many 
loopholes exist that continue to allow for the perpetuation of extractive practices. They state 
that, “simply put, NSMD systems are too sparsely used, weakly worded, and poorly enforces to 
reverse broader patterns of deforestation that plague agricultural commodity-driven 
economies” (van der Ven et. al, 2018: 149).  
It is important to bear in mind that this consumer-based approach perpetuates issues of 
power, class, gender inequalities etc. by not also addressing the obstacles preventing 
disenfranchised people from participating. Products with certifications are often more costly 
and may not even be available in marginalized communities, and these dynamics are 
disregarded in favor of pushing consumers to vote with their dollar to create change. The 




therefore unlikely to be slowed by consumer-based campaigns (Pye 2018). Since plantations are 
suited for tropical regions, exporting countries have access to a unique and important source of 
capital, so there if generally strong government support behind palm oil. Since palm oil is so 
closely tied to the landscape, corporations having closer relationships with state governments 
also includes issues of power and control over lands in resources (Peluso & Lund, 2011). It is not 
uncommon for states to grant corporate permits or tax subsidies to help facilitate expansion to 
new commodity frontiers (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017; Pye, 2018). This is also linked to corrupt 
or illegal agreements and processes to ensure development in target areas, such as 
disregarding emissions, pollution, or fires (Pye, 2018). 
 
Displacement 
Many target areas for palm oil production in exporting countries are inhabited by rural 
communities which have historically managed the landscapes. To neglect their protection 
would be to disrupt a close relationship between people and the natural resources they rely on 
for subsistence, as well as the power and class dynamics preventing them from being able to 
resist this sort of development. This form of displacement also indirectly contributes to 
deforestation, as people are often forced to clear new land to inhabit (Castiblanco et. al, 2013).  
Other forms of dispossession occur through smallholder recruitment. Financial 
incentives and production targets are commonly implemented to welcome smallholders to the 
industry to boost production for export (Zoomers, 2010; Hall, et. al, 2015). However, these 
often-informal agreements result in the loss of control over agricultural landscapes, or the 




State encourages small scale farmers to shift production from food crops to palm oil in 
partnership with larger corporations (Avila et. al, 2018). Engaging with smallholders is 
promoted through discourse depicting the industry as “an environmentally sustainable way to 
economic prosperity” (Bennett et. al, 2018: 39). This language has perpetuated the 
misconception that palm oil is a sustainable alternative to its nonrenewable counterparts. As 
Selfa et. al (2015) put it, 
As with any development intervention, policies and programs designed to expand the 
bioenergy sector should incorporate systematic efforts to evaluate how development 
benefits are distributed and whether any social groups are adversely affected by the 
development. [Our] comparative case studies have identified specific negative social 
impacts affecting the livelihoods of people in three Latin American nations. These 
include increases in food insecurity, loss of income, land concentration, and the loss of 
access to land and natural resources, which are especially affecting peasant farmers, 
poor communities, and indigenous peoples (Selfa et. al, 2015: 1326). 
 
Palm oil might appear to be a crucial step in solving nutritional deficiencies, increasing 
accessibility to a renewable fuel source, and producing many staple products at more 
affordable prices. While palm oil has changed a commercial landscape previously dominated by 
nonrenewable resources and more agronomically-intensive crops, the supporting discourse 
claiming it to be a miracle product is problematic. The consequences of palm oil’s establishment 
and expansion in producing countries are severe, and the lack of transparency and complete 




tropical agricultural land based on a false premise that palm oil is a sustainable alternative to 
other fuels, including competing biofuels.  
 
Armed Conflict and Plan Colombia 
Colombia is a critical case for analyzing the growth of the industry because palm oil is 
closely tied to armed conflict exacerbated by US foreign policy. Oil palm plantation expansion 
can be attributed to Plan Colombia, a USAID program which established diplomatic and military 
relationships between the United States and Colombia (Avilés, 2008; Paley, 2015). These 
programs focused largely on border control, reducing drug trafficking between nations, and 
promoting national security of participating countries.  
 
Conflict Overview 
The latest period of armed conflict in Colombia has existed for over 60 years and is 
considered the oldest conflict in the western hemisphere (Melamed & Espitia, 2017). Over the 
course of several decades, conflict generated a staggering death toll in the hundreds of 
thousands, many of whom were civilians (World Peace Foundation, 2016; Melamed & Espitia, 
2017). In addition to this, there were massive amounts of forced displacement to urban areas 
and Venezuela, kidnappings, sexual violence, and forced recruitments of adolescents across the 
country (Bailey, 1967; Melamed & Espitia, 2017). The United Nations High Commissioner for 




[The] conflict is characterized by widespread use of landmines, recruitment of child 
soldiers, the practice of blockading communities as well as systematic violation of 
the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians and other principles of 
international humanitarian law by the irregular armed groups. It is also important to 
note that income distribution within Colombian society is highly unequal with 62% 
of the population living below the poverty line and 28% living in extreme poverty. In 
sum, Colombia is plagued by a humanitarian crisis of enormous magnitude (UNHCR, 
2006: 2). 
Conflict reached all corners of the country and only estimates exist for the number of 
deaths, human rights violations, and other acts of terror (Bailey, 1967). Part of the reason for 
this is that in many cases, violence was carried out or ordered by people in positions of power 
who kept their actions undocumented or unofficial (Bailey, 1967). Partisan rivalry is not 
unfamiliar to Colombia, which previously experienced a civil war between the Conservative and 
Liberal parties starting in 1876 (Bailey, 1967). In this case, though, the widespread deaths 
mostly affected the fighting forces (Bailey, 1967). The current, ongoing armed conflict in 
Colombia differs in that it is not one long-term or isolated incident and it also affected civilians 
profoundly (Bailey, 1967). The focus of analysis for many is centered on Cold War era conflict 
consisting of the organization of armed Communist guerrilla groups in the 1960s (Melamed & 
Espitia, 2017), but there are various periods of partisan rivalry-based violence between the 
Colombian Liberal Party and Conservative Party providing catalysts dating back to the 1930s 




In 1930, the election of Liberal Enrique Olaya Herrera ended a period of Conservative 
Party control (Bailey, 1967; World Peace Foundation, 2016). Anti-Conservatives celebrated this 
win with assassinations and property destruction erupted in the departments2 of Santander 
and Boyacá (Bailey, 1967; World Peace Foundation, 2016). The Liberal Party maintained 
executive control of the government for 16 years until the Liberal party became divided 
between moderates and reformists, resulting in the election of Conservative Mariano Ospina 
Pérez in 1946 (Bailey, 1967; World Peace Foundation, 2016). Conservatives responded just as 
violently in celebration, and partisan conflict began to escalate once more. However, it did not 
subside this time (Bailey, 1967; World Peace Foundation, 2016).  
Nearing the next election, the popular Liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, who had lost 
in 1946, was assassinated on April 9, 1948 in Bogotá (World Peace Foundation, 2016; Melamed 
& Espitia, 2017; Garrard et al., 2019; Díaz et. al, 2020). The Liberal Party held a majority and 
gained significant popularity in rural areas, largely because Gaitán’s populist platform appealed 
to peasants and working people (Bailey, 1967). During his career as an attorney, he notably and 
harshly critiqued the national armed forces’ brutal massacre of the United Fruit Company 
workers on strike for improved working conditions in 1928 (Garrard et al., 2019). Gaitán was 
also a proponent of labor reform and unions, agrarian reform, and women’s suffrage (Garrard 
et al., 2019). His death marked the beginning of the period known as La Violencia in Colombia 
(Díaz et. al, 2020). The two days following the assassination were filled with bloodshed, sexual 
violence, and property destruction targeting conservatives, followed by the almost complete 
restructuring of the police to a conservative force to address them (Bailey, 1967). From 1948 to 
 




1958, systematic and politically charged violence ravaged the country with approximately 
112,000 deaths between 1948 and 1950 alone, and 300,000 by the 1960s (World Peace 
Foundation, 2016; Garrard et al., 2019). Another estimated two million people either migrated 
or were displaced (World Peace Foundation, 2016).  
La Violencia peaked in the late 1940s and early 1950s as armed groups consisting of 
militarized peasants on either side of the political spectrum formed and mobilized (World Peace 
Foundation, 2016). With the number of these militias forming with Liberal and Communist 
roots, the Colombian government deployed the national armed forces to quell the insurgents 
(World Peace Foundation, 2016; Melamed & Espitia, 2017). Pérez’s Conservative successor, 
Laureano Gómez Castro, took office in 1950 until the successful military coup by army general 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in 1953 (Bailey, 1967; World Peace Foundation, 2016; Melamed & Espitia, 
2017).  
By this point in the conflict, violence occurred at all levels. The national army and police 
fought alongside government hired Conservative paramilitaries made up of peasants against 
Liberal and Communist-driven guerrillas (Melamed & Espitia, 2017). Conservative forces 
became more organized and unofficial armed groups received government support and even 
Conservative local officials mobilized peasants within their jurisdiction to help engage in anti-
Communist and anti-Liberal battles as well as further their personal political agendas (World 
Peace Foundation, 2016). It is important to bear in mind the importance of the role of the 
militarization of peasants in this conflict. With virtually no power to oppose participation in 
local battles, peasants were often put in positions to fight with each other (World Peace 




partisan rivalry to conflict over land and resources as they were seized by armed groups, 
concentrating more extreme forms of violence in rural and predominately agrarian regions of 
the country (Bailey, 1967; Maher, 2015; World Peace Foundation, 2016; Hurtado Lozano et. al, 
2017; Melamed & Espitia, 2017). Civilians were consequently entangled in conflict as guerrillas, 
paramilitaries, and the national army clashed on their lands (Melamed & Espitia, 2017). In the 
Department of Tolima alone, 34,730 farms were abandoned and the equivalent of 400-500 
million US dollars’ worth of property were demolished between 1946 and 1958 (Bailey, 1967). 
La Violencia ushered in a new era of terror, with armed groups employing new methods of 
violence and fearmongering. Norman A. Bailey (1967) affirms, 
Certain techniques of death and torture became so common and widespread that they 
were given names, such as picar para tamal, which consisted of cutting up the body of 
the living victim into small pieces, bit by bit. Or "bocachiquiar", a process which involved 
making hundreds of small body punctures from which the victim slowly bled to death. 
Ingenious forms of quartering and beheading were invented and given such names as 
the "corte de mica", "corte de franela”, "corte de corbata", and so on. Crucifixions and 
hangings were commonplace, political "prisoners" were thrown from airplanes in flight, 
infants were bayoneted, schoolchildren, some as young as eight years old, were raped 
en masse, unborn infants were removed by crude Caesarian section and replaced by 
roosters, ears were cut off, scalps removed, and so on (Bailey, 1967: 562).  
Rojas Pinilla’s administration took strong action against civil warfare and violence was 
reduced significantly under Martial Law (World Peace Foundation, 2016; Melamed & Espitia, 




agreed to lay down their arms, which was accepted by several thousand fighters (Bailey, 1967; 
World Peace Foundation, 2016; Melamed & Espitia, 2017). However, violence did not disappear 
completely. Rural areas without significant official State presence continued to experience 
fighting between the army and armed peasants and guerrillas, and many who were affected by 
ongoing bloodshed participated in robberies or joined armed groups themselves (World Peace 
Foundation, 2016). By the mid-1950s, conflicting forces consisted of people at all levels of 
society and even bandits and militias were working with and hired by corrupt officials to secure 
territories, hoard resources, and assure the cooperation of rural people in vulnerable areas 
(Bailey, 1967). Farmers were disproportionately affected and forced to give up critical crops 
such as coffee, cacao, and sugar, while others were forced to sell their land well below market 
price (Bailey, 1967).  
Though he is credited for the reduction of violence during his rule, Rojas Pinilla was also 
heavily criticized for corruption and maladministration (Bailey, 1967; Melamed & Espitia, 2017). 
This resulted the 1957 formation of the Frente Nacional3 four years after the coup, an 
agreement between the Colombian Liberal and Conservative parties to begin alternating 
presidencies and bring back civilian leadership (Bailey, 1967; World Peace Foundation, 2016; 
Melamed & Espitia, 2017). This reinstated the centralized power of government in the state but 
also sparked mobilization among more radical leftists in the form of newer and more organized 
guerrilla groups. Those in opposition to the Frente Nacional felt that the effort diminished 
political freedom by limiting the democratic process (World Peace Foundation, 2016; Melamed 
 




& Espitia, 2017). In addition, the Conservative party began to build strength through the police 
and public forces by replacing leaders with their own in response (Bailey, 1967).  
During the Cold War era, Communism became increasingly popular in Latin America and 
was heavily influenced by the Cuban Revolution, much to the disdain of the United States and 
Catholic Church (Melamed & Espitia, 2017). With new leftist movements gaining traction, the 
United States increased its presence in Latin American countries. In 1961, John F. Kennedy 
launched the Alliance for Progress, a plan to solidify economic relationships with target 
countries through antipoverty efforts as well as providing support for counterinsurgency efforts 
(Melamed & Espitia, 2017).  
The largest of the so-called insurgents is known as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
Colombianas4, or the FARC. Originally a smaller group based in rural areas, the FARC consisted 
mainly of armed peasants who began to mobilize during Pérez’s presidency. They initially 
organized under the name Bloque Sur5 in response to an army attack in what was referred to as 
the Republic of Marquetalia in the interior region’s Department of Tolima, which served as one 
of several armed peasant-led communist or “soviet” strongholds in the country (Bailey, 1967; 
Melamed & Espitia, 2017; Díaz et. al, 2020). In 1964, they were renamed as the FARC and were 
led by Manuel “Tirofijo” (Sureshot) Marulanda (Bailey, 1967; Garrard et al., 2019) 
The attack in Marquetalia is considered part of the United States Plan LASO, or the Latin 
American Security Operation in 1962, which deployed military support, training, and strategy 
from the United States to target the republics strongholds (Bailey, 1967; Melamed & Espitia, 
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2017). Unfortunately, these targets were also agricultural areas and were decimated by 
bombing (Melamed & Espitia, 2017). The other well-known guerrilla force is the Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional6 (ELN). Though smaller in size, the ELN was formed in Santander in the 
northern region of Colombia and consisted of around 5,000 troops (Melamed & Espitia, 2017; 
Garrard et al., 2019). Unlike the FARC, the ELN was not created by peasants and were directly 
influenced by Marx and the Cuban Revolution (Melamed & Espitia, 2017). One of the most 
influential but brief leaders of the group was Father Camilo Torres, who was a sociologist and 
Catholic Priest, but was killed in combat in 1965 (Garrard et al., 2019). The ELN approached 
things a bit differently, and engaged in kidnappings for ransom, targeting even United States oil 
executives to gain capital, as well as working with narcotraffickers (Garrard et al., 2019). Many 
members of the ELN trained in combat in Cuba, and later they quietly gained assistance from 
Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez (Garrard et al., 2019). During this time, drug-related groups increased 
their presence in areas of conflict (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017). 
By the 1990s, the death rate in Colombia was one of the highest in the world and still 
exhibited gruesome methods of instilling terror such as the “necktie,” where the tongues of 
dead bodies were pulled through slit throats (Garrard et al., 2019). Despite intervention from 
the United States thus far, the national army and police forces could not suppress the growing 
guerrilla troops and opted to increase the employment of the right-wing paramilitary known as 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia7 (AUC) to broaden their reach (Fergusson et. al, 2014; 
Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2014; Maher, 2015; Garrard et al., 2019). Bear in mind that the link that 
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exists between Colombian national army and the AUC means that the paramilitaries carry out 
unofficial government operations against guerrillas, which are often very visible and egregious 
acts of violence (Avilés, 2008; Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). As such, the national army is 
known for being supportive of paramilitary efforts and the narcotraffickers that help fund them 
(Avilés, 2008; Chalk, 2011). Since the AUC is not an official part of the national army, they are 
able to operate independently and outside the rule of law while the government’s role in 
operations maintains a low profile (Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). Their alliance with the 
conservative party meant that they perpetuated anti-communism rhetoric to defend the 
seizure of resources and violence (Garrard et al., 2019).  In fact, they produced more deaths in 
Colombia than the FARC (Garrard et al., 2019).  
During the 1990s, the FARC and the national army agreed to a ceasefire which resulted 
in a semblance of peace in urban centers while the FARC continued to expand control over rural 
territories out of the scope of the upper class (Garrard et al., 2019). Acreage dedicated to coca 
production in Colombia increased from 13,500ha in the beginning of the 1990s to 122,500ha by 
1999, and was a significant source of income for the FARC, ELN, and the AUC, as well as cocaine 
for the U.S. market (Avilés, 2008; Garrard et al., 2019).  
 Increased presence of armed forces contributes greatly to social unrest and extractive 
measures in target regions. It generates countless refugees who flee to urban areas and 
drastically affects the landscapes they once inhabited (Fergusson et. al, 2014). Natural 
resources specifically continue to spark tension between opposing parties and are weaponized 
to gain a strategic advantage. This occurs through the destruction or increased exploitation of, 




Fergusson et. al, 2014). Despite the intent of these tactics to weaken ‘enemy’ armed forces, the 
consequences are suffered by civilians who may continue to live in the areas under conflict. 
Local economies are disrupted while agricultural landscapes are seized for illicit crop production 
(Fergusson et. al, 2014). In many cases, increased presence of armed forces may lead to a rising 
demand for resources and result in unsustainable and extractive handling of forest products 
(Machlis & Hanson, 2008; Fergusson et. al, 2014; Castro-Nuñez et al., 2017; Negret et al., 2019).  
Using satellite-based estimates, Fergusson et. al (2014) concluded that between 1990 and 2010, 
the intensification of paramilitary presence contributed to major deforestation and increased 
presence of coca producers in target areas (Fergusson et. al, 2014).  
 
Plan Colombia 
Plan Colombia, a military and diplomatic “counter-narcotics and development plan” 
(Avilés, 2008) was introduced in Colombia and signed into law by President Bill Clinton in July 
2000 (Avilés, 2008). This six-year program invested $1.6 billion USD and provided military and 
police support and training to increase the Colombian state’s counter-insurgency capacity 
against militarized guerrilla groups; specifically, the FARC and the ELN (Avilés, 2008; Delgado-
Ramos & Romano, 2011; Paley, 2015; Maher, 2015; Camacho & Mejía, 2017). These efforts 
were concentrated mainly in strategic areas, such as borders shared with neighboring 
countries, and territories housing natural resources of importance to the United States. In 
addition, the plan included market strategies and free trade agreements between the two 




Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). By 2005, the United States had sent hundreds of military 
personnel and private military contractors to Colombia (Paley, 2015).  
Arguments for intervention in Colombia stressed that addressing the largest sites of 
coca production would lessen the amount of cocaine entering the United States (Aviles, 2008; 
Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). In the matter of national security, drugs contribute to 
unemployment and corruption, destabilizing the socioeconomic and political systems in place 
(Aviles, 2008; Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). As such, it is deemed critical to boost these 
countries’ “integration into capitalist globalization” (Aviles, 2008) by shifting production away 
from illicit crops through a combination of military and economic development strategies.  
Political discourse in the United States largely focuses on reinforcing national security and 
government stability (Aviles, 2008; Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). Adhering to the military-
based National Security Doctrine of the United States, counter insurgency8 plans between the 
US and Latin American countries are often adopted to minimize potential threats entering the 
US by building the political armed forces of participating States (Aviles, 2008; Delgado-Ramos & 
Romano, 2011; Maher & Thomson, 2011).  
Here, activity near or on drug production sites is considered justification to increase 
policing target areas, as they are current or potential threats to national security. 
Unfortunately, this approach tends to criminalize forms of social resistance and affects civilians 
living in target areas (Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). The emphasis on border protection 
and control also creates a seemingly official reason for the United States to intervene in Latin 
 
8  Per the National Security Doctrine, “insurgency” is defined as the “systematic use of violence to overthrow and 




America under the guise of working towards common goals for security and economic 
development (Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011). This in turn continues the extension of 
political power internationally, an imperialist and expansionist venture to protect the highly 
coveted resources and markets for corporate investments such as oil (Avilés. 2008; Delgado-
Ramos & Romano, 2011). As global dependence on raw materials and energy continues, there 
is a strong connection between natural resources and efforts towards security and stability in 
exporting countries (Avilés. 2008; Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011).  
The majority of Plan Colombia took place during the Uribe administration in Colombia 
(2002-2010), which overlapped with George W. Bush’s administration in the United States 
(Chalk, 2011; Paley, 2015; Garrard et al., 2019). The initial proposed plan aimed to establish a 
peace process with the FARC, promote development in rural areas, and increase exports from 
Colombia (Avilés, 2008). The final Plan Colombia included these in addition to input from TNCs 
and other corporate actors, the United States, and Colombian representatives (Avilés, 2008).  
After the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, George 
W. Bush included guerrillas in Colombia on the official list of terrorist organizations and 
increased United States support against insurgents (Garrard et al., 2019). Those in support of 
the initiative argued that it would help develop a United States style of justice system by 
expanding policing in Colombia (Paley, 2015). While the United States made up nearly half of 
demand for cocaine on the market, “support” mainly intended to impede the supply of cocaine 
from Colombia but were also extended to FARC strongholds outside of coca cultivated areas 
(Avilés, 2008; Chalk, 2011). These efforts came in the form of special training for armed forces 




transfer of ground-based radar systems, helicopter troop carriers, and various forms of heavy 
artillery; the institution of in-country training programs aimed at augmenting coastal 
surveillance and interdiction, port security, containerized cargo inspections, and high-speed 
pursuit tactics; the deployment of U.S. special forces advisers to create elite antidrug units in 
both the police and army; and the provision of technical advice and equipment to facilitate 
ground and aerial crop-eradication efforts (Chalk, 2011; Camacho & Mejía, 2017).  
With this, Uribe expanded the national army and police force from 120,000 to 180,000 
and 90,000 to 120,000, respectively (Garrard et al., 2019). His work with the United States 
earned him recognition as an important ally in the “war on terror” initiative and positive 
approval ratings in Colombia (Garrard et al., 2019). Additionally, Uribe began new negotiations 
with guerrillas and the AUC to demobilize by offering reduced sentences and preventing 
extradition to the United States for fighters involved in narcotrafficking (Garrard et al., 2019).  
Despite the plethora of approaches to weaken the drug trade, Plan Colombia failed as 
an effort to diminish cocaine produced in Colombia. Aerial crop spraying programs distributed 
potent herbicide widely, a form of chemical warfare across coca regions (Chalk, 2011; Paley, 
2015). The herbicide in question was the glyphosate contained in the commercial herbicide 
RoundupÒ mixed with a Colombian-owned surfactant called Cosmo-Flux 411F, which is an 
additive that decreases surface tension and allows the herbicide to penetrate surfaces more 
deeply (U.S. Department of State, n.d; Chalk, 2011; Henao-Muñoz et al., 2013; Camacho & 
Mejía, 2017).  
Widespread application of this fortified glysophate by air has been noted to affect legal 




of that, it did little to curb coca cultivation even though the United States invested over $8 
billion USD into the plan between 2000 and 2009 (Paley, 2015). Despite aerial spraying 
programs and manual eradication, coca producers developed methods to combat herbicide. 
These include applying molasses to the plants to prevent the herbicide from penetrating plant 
tissue (Mejía, 2014; Mejía, 2016). Violent confrontations were also reported, with cases of 
armed groups using land mines or violent confrontation to combat manual eradication efforts 
(Mejía, 2016). There were 116,000 hectares of land dedicated to coca in 2009 and Colombia still 
supplied most of the cocaine on the market (Chalk, 2011). In more recent years, reports of 
glyphosate being carcinogenic (Mejía, 2016), contributing to miscarriages, and having 
“dermatological and respiratory [impacts] on humans” (Camacho & Mejía, 2017).  
 As an economic endeavor, however, Plan Colombia greatly benefited the United States, 
Colombia, and TNCs (Avilés, 2008; Paley, 2015). New policing and military tactics backed by the 
United States supported security in areas with coveted natural resources coupled with policy 
networks supporting foreign investment progressed integration into the global market (Avilés, 
2008). Global coffee prices had begun to decrease as more competing exporters were 
introduced and Colombia’s agrarian sector suffered because joining this growing international 
marketplace contributed to unemployment (Avilés, 2008). Campesinos in neglected rural areas 
struggled with little to no government support, and the combination of economic hardships 
coupled with a declining agricultural sector pushed many towards the more lucrative 
businesses of coca and poppy production (Avilés, 2008; Mejía, 2016). Colombia soon became 
the largest producer of cocaine entering the United States, leading to new efforts by the United 




Colombia experienced consistent GDP growth throughout the 2000s and during Uribe’s 
presidency, a quarter of which was accounted for by international trade (Maher, 2015). 
Economic growth also coincided with increased violence, particularly regarding palm oil. This 
only increased with rising global demand for palm oil and resulted in forced displacement and 
violent forms of intimidation by the national army and right-wing paramilitaries as a land 
clearing tactic. Abandoned land is then made available for the establishment of palm 
plantations (Maher, 2015).  
These measures used to enforce and extend Plan Colombia, laid the foundation for the 
free trade agreement and the 2008 Mérida Initiative, a similar military training and surveillance 
counter narcotics plan in Mexico (Delgado-Ramos & Romano, 2011; Chalk, 2011; Paley, 2015). 
The agreement intended to impose tariffs to cover losses from the drug trade and increase 
employment (Paley, 2015) and continued to strengthen Colombia’s capacity for foreign 
investment and business ventures. Uribe’s successor, Juan Manuel Santos, took office in 2010 
and was previously his defense minister (Garrard et al., 2019). Santos maintained Uribe’s 
hardline policies against insurgents, but also expanded the use of false positives9 in target 
regions, a method often carried out by the AUC (Garrard et al., 2019). In 2016, an armistice was 
negotiated and signed in November (Garrard et al., 2019).     
 
 
9 False positives- the practice of counting or dressing civilians up as guerrillas in order to make it seem as though 




Palm Oil and Exacerbated Conflict  
African palm is not new to Colombia and has been cultivated in the country for over 60 
years, with plantations on record as early as 1945 (Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017; Hurtado 
Lozano et. al, 2017). Development of the industry expanded between 1990 and 2010, as the 
country explored new export markets. Colombia has grown from roughly 5,000 hectares of land 
dedicated to palm oil in 1962 to 540,000 hectares in 2020 (INALDE, 2019). The first decade in 
the 2000s brought a 229% increase in price per ton of palm oil (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017; 
Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017), which coincides with the economic growth witnessed during 
Plan Colombia. During that same decade, Colombia became the largest producer in Latin 
America and fifth largest in the world (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017; Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 
2017).  
There is a direct relationship between displacement and palm oil. Palm oil production is 
a lucrative business which attracts armed groups engaging in illegal activity (Hurtado Lozano et. 
al, 2017). Though plantations require relatively little post-establishment labor in terms of 
maintenance, harvesting is an expensive and intensive process (Maher, 2015). It also occurs 
year-round to keep up with fruit production, so operating an oil palm plantation requires a 
significant amount of consistent capital in addition to the high upfront cost of establishment 
(Palacios, 2012; Maher, 2015). For that reason, there is a push for larger operations to increase 
production to make up for the invested capital (Palacios, 2012). The industry grew drastically 
alongside increased levels of forced displacement, violence, and disappearances between the 
1980s and 1990s (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017). Each of the armed groups have targeted palm 




paramilitaries (Ocampo Valencia, 2009). The AUC began to intensify and grow their presence in 
areas producing palm, bananas, and livestock, and offered locals “protection” in exchange for 
imposed illegal taxes (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017), a violent form of coercion also referred to 
as “gunpoint conservation” (Fergusson et. al, 2014).  
 Rising demand for palm oil brought a matching rise in demand for land, and 
displacement became a tool to clear land to secure territory and sell “abandoned” land to 
companies for new plantations (Lozano et. al, 2017). As with any expansion of a commodity 
frontier, continuing demand requires more land, more technology, and is an ongoing process 
(Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017). Dispossession of land through extortion, coercion, and violence 
helped to secure these for corporate and state interests (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017), greatly 
affecting small scale farmers and making it difficult for small-scale palm growers to compete for 
land (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017). This tends to occur on a larger scale in efforts to clear land 
for palm oil than to produce illicit crops (Palacios, 2012) because target areas often have less 
government presence (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017), allowing extortion by the AUC and conflict 
between armed groups to continue unchecked.  
From 1990 and 2013, there were 348,280 reported registered victims of forced 
displacement, 87 percent of which occurred during the ten-year palm oil boom. Given global 
recognition of environmental degradation and human rights violations due to biofuel 
development projects, these crises have created new opportunities for the construction of a 
sustainability narrative to promote the palm oil industry. Maher (2015) argued that the 
expansion of plantations in Colombia, the fourth largest producer and exporter of palm oil 




[In] the case of palm oil, violence perpetrated by Colombia’s public security forces and 
paramilitaries has cleared and secured areas for the expansion of African palm cultivation, 
production and exportation. Moreover, these armed actors have created a model of 
‘peaceful’ industrial relations underpinned by violence. This violence has lowered labour 
costs and facilitated the greater precariousness of labour conditions, ensuring that the 
benefits of economic growth related to palm oil are largely realised by palm oil companies 
vis-a`-vis palm oil workers. Violence has thus created an attractive business climate for both 
domestic and foreign capital (Maher, 2015: 321). 
 His findings suggests that specific forms of violence in civil warfare can contribute to the 
exposure of areas vulnerable to the industry. As part of Plan Colombia, palm oil development 
inherently targeted areas with narcotraffickers and guerrillas (Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017). 
Funding supported “land intensive technology” (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017: 442) for 
plantations such as refineries and mills in addition to cropland (Pye, 2018). In the department 
of Magdalena alone, 348,280 victims of displacement were registered in between 1990 and 
2013, and over 80 percent of them were expelled between 2000 and 2010 (Hurtado Lozano et. 
al, 2017), which overlaps with Plan Colombia. The department of Magdalena specifically, 
accounted for ten percent of nationwide palm production, with palm oil dominating 62% of the 
agricultural landscape (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017). Forceful eviction due to palm oil in this 
department exceeded that caused by confrontations between opposing armed forces (Hurtado 
Lozano et. al, 2017). This is also the case in Indonesia, the largest exporter of palm oil, where 
internal conflicts include struggles over land tenure, and many are located on the island of 





Plan Colombia ended in 2006, but its effects are still felt to this day. High rates of 
displacement continue, and guerrilla and paramilitary groups are still active. As a counter 
narcotics strategy, the Plan failed spectacularly to eradicate illicit crop production (Paley, 2015). 
Cocaine continued to make its way unhindered to the United States (Paley, 2015). The real 
“success” of the Plan lies in securing territories for corporate interests, particularly in 
underground resource, oil, and gas sectors (Fergusson et. al, 2014; Paley, 2015). Displacement 
served as useful tool to grow the economy through the eviction of people from land which 
would later be “occupied and exploited by transnational corporations” (Paley, 2015: 117) all 
under the guise of addressing the illegal drug trade (Maher, 2015; Paley, 2015).  
Colombia is among the most biodiverse countries to have experienced growth in 
agribusiness, and more specifically, palm oil (Ocampo-Peñuela et. al, 2018). However, the 
environmental degradation caused by intensified conflict and palm plantations is both arduous 
and costly, especially at sites of violent confrontation and massacre (Fergusson et. al, 2014). 
Gunpoint conservation and other terror tactics prevented conservation and local land 
management efforts, and many lands seized by armed groups were quickly cleared to establish 
ranches or coca plantations (Fergusson et. al, 2014). Current literature establishes connections 
between palm oil and violence, palm oil and environmental degradation, USAID and increased 






To illustrate the connections between these three elements, I designated indicator variables 
with available data to represent each. Displacement represents increased violence over time 
because exact numbers of death are impossible to determine because of methods used to 
disappear victims and dispose of bodies. Displacement estimates are available through 
Colombia’s Red Nacional de Información (RNI) through Unidad para las Víctimas10. RNI sources 
information from departmental and municipal governments and victims to provide support for 
victims of armed conflict in accordance with Ley 1448 de 201111, which states,  
La presente ley tiene por objeto establecer un conjunto de medidas judiciales, 
administrativas, sociales y económicas, individuales y colectivas, en beneficio de las víctimas 
de las violaciones contempladas en el artículo 3º de la presente ley, dentro de un marco de 
justicia transicional, que posibiliten hacer efectivo el goce de sus derechos a la verdad, la 
justicia y la reparación con garantía de no repetición, de modo que se reconozca su 
condición de víctimas y se dignifique a través de la materialización de sus derechos 
constitucionales (Congreso de Colombia, 2016). 
 
The purpose of this law is to establish a set of judicial, administrative, social and economic 
measures, individual and collective, for the benefit of the victims of the violations 
contemplated in article 3 of this law, within a framework of transitional justice, which 
makes it possible to enjoy their rights to truth, justice, and reparation with a guarantee of 
 
10 National Information Network within Colombia’s national Victims’ Unit 




non-repetition, so that their status as victims is recognized and dignified through the 
materialization of their constitutional rights (Congreso de Colombia, 2016; personal 
translation). 
  
The data provided through the RNI represents estimates of the number of people expelled12, 
received13, and declared14 over time.  
As a USAID initiative, Plan Colombia is tracked through annual USAID disbursements to 
Colombia via the USAID (USAID, n.d.) as a measure of investment over time. The USAID site 
provides data regarding monetary commitments to each country receiving aid, as well as the 
actual annual disbursements. Aid to Colombia was documented as early as the 1940s.  
Last, palm oil hectarage was available from two sources. Fedepalma, or La Federación 
Nacional de Cultivadores de Palma de Aceite15, a corporate organization supporting the growth 
and development of the palm industry in Colombia. They were formed in the 1960s and work 
with palmeros16 with operations of all sizes, promoting competitive business strategy, 
programming, and market research to help ensure the success of the Colombian palm sector. 
Fedepalma produces annual data regarding current and developing hectarage are available, as 
 
12 The number of people expelled approximates people evicted from their lands each year.  
13 The number of people received approximates the inflow of people to new destinations, such as urban areas, 
after being removed from their lands. This generally aligns with the number expelled. 
14 The number of people declared reflects the number of people who came forward to formally report 
displacement. It is important to consider factors that affect the number of declared victims of displacement, as 
threats, terror tactics, etc., may prevent them from coming forward. 
15 National Federation of Oil Palm Growers of Colombia 




well as information about processing and scientific research and programming (Fedepalma, 
2016)17. 
Agronet is the Network of Information and Communication of Agriculture and Livestock in 
Colombia through the Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural18, which provides palm oil 
hectarage through agricultural census data (Agronet, 2017). I chose to include this additional 
source to highlight the difference between available corporate and state information, as the 
data provided by the Ministerio are notably different than that of Fedepalma (Figure 4), and 
national data are available beginning in 1987. This is likely because the agricultural census in 
Colombia was inconsistently conducted over several years (Acosta Moreno & Pérez Gómez, 
2011).  
To demonstrate the impact of Plan Colombia, I chose to include national data extending 
beyond the six years of the program, both before and after the period 2000 to 2006. Available 
data from these sources extended from 1985 to 2019 (Table 1, below), which allows us to view 
trends prior to, during, and after Plan Colombia.  
 
 
17 While Fedepalma offers spreadsheets of data on palm hectarage, there are also PDF files which include graphs as 
well as annual hectarage. When downloading an Excel data file for the given date range, I discovered that the first 
several numbers were inconsistent with the PDF files. The hectarage reflected in this dataset has been compiled 
from the PDF versions of the data, for which users must manually enter date ranges and download the 
corresponding PDF files (Fedepalma, 2016). 
 





Table 1. Compiled USAID, Palm Oil hectarage, and National Displacement data from 1987-2019 (Fedepalma, 2016; Agronet, 
2017; Unidad Para Las Víctimas, 2020; USAID, n.d.) 
To accommodate outliers and better represent the trend of USAID investment over time, I also 
created a chart of 3-year averages, consisting of the mean of a given year and the two before it 
(Table 2, below). After compiling data, I plotted each variable over time. 
FEDEPALMA MinAg Expelled Received Declared
1985 24,880,769.00            14,666 11,526                  2                                   
1986 25,323,190.00            16,281 13,245                  2                                   
1987 26,384,846.00            78,396.00              51,560.00                20,085 15,943                  2                                   
1988 27,745,745.00            94,412.00              62,870.00                34,451 26,607                  8                                   
1989 131,500,603.00         103,396.00           76,135.00                30,760 23,962                  25                                
1990 198,755,919.00                     111,380.00                  89,671.00 39,483 32,343                  281                             
1991 129,418,062.00         116,694.00           97,604.00                34,723 28,818                  4                                   
1992 138,115,251.00         120,942.00           108,510.00             45,978 38,232                  25                                
1993 133,054,319.00         123,070.00           113,395.00             51,605 43,402                  4                                   
1994 48,564,887.00            125,856.00           125,321.00             56,119 46,565                  31                                
1995 44,602,037.00            130,400.00           131,067.00             109,457 93,793                  356                             
1996 32,152,842.00            135,459.00           133,688.00             142,035 114,442               3,481                        
1997 158,191,051.00         134,648.00           145,134.00             254,050 218,954               16,305                     
1998 172,758,898.00         144,589.00           147,493.00             247,208 222,787               61,637                     
1999 478,968,756.00         150,851.00           148,644.00             281,308 235,501               50,907                     
2000 1,684,925,135.00    158,019.00           147,439.00             607,563 584,634               331,175                  
2001 371,670,209.00         175,455.00           154,331.00             666,436 647,385               443,459                  
2002 740,714,176.00         194,431.00           155,208.00             772,255 745,023               529,087                  
2003 934,282,778.00         211,265.00           167,361.00             466,396 448,963               277,477                  
2004 836,099,283.00         229,199.00           180,227.00             425,706 418,294               258,238                  
2005 902,370,725.00         259,751.00           192,970.00             485,386 477,586               317,534                  
2006 1,528,288,974.00    291,831.00           208,875.00             464,755 471,917               382,675                  
2007 460,958,881.00         307,482.00           221,601.00             484,840 494,287               466,536                  
2008 853,052,302.00         325,327.00           246,586.00             427,360 453,059               524,143                  
2009 1,018,057,221.00    352,004.00           258,907.00             257,486 283,009               448,932                  
2010 928,610,882.00         379,611.00           284,241.00             200,669 219,259               395,422                  
2011 454,191,714.00         405,656.00           334,416.00             239,473 250,497               453,077                  
2012 784,088,686.00         426,795.00           344,643.00             240,892 223,524               536,952                  
2013 279,390,746.00         456,419.00           379,966.00             260,706 251,858               741,152                  
2014 610,249,639.00         470,219.00           430,634.00             251,796 252,612               783,887                  
2015 899,215,689.00         487,748.00           479,663.00             188,847 177,345               690,853                  
2016 346,191,271.00         505,966.00           498,962.00             104,263 94,032                  143,191                  
2017 551,965,767.00         523,458.00           528,351.00             98,576 83,226                  137,457                  
2018 526,211,671.00         547,756.00           137,909 115,323               161,631                  
2019 800,747,494.00         568,386.00           74,772 61,609                  101,499                  
Displacement









Table 2. 3-year Average of annual USAID disbursements 
 Additionally, I conducted a one-way or single factor analysis of variance (ANOVA), which 
is a method used to compare the means of samples across separate groups (Babbie, 2013; 
Christensen, 2018; Hess & Hess, 2018). In other words, the mean of each group is compared to 
its counterparts to determine whether the groups are statistically significant or independent 
from one another. In this case, I sought to compare displacement, USAID funding, and palm oil 
hectarage data pre-Plan Colombia (1985-1999), during Plan Colombia (2000-2006), and post-
Plan Colombia (2007-2019). A significant difference between the means of these periods would 
Year
3 Year Avg. USAID 
(USD)
1987 25,529,601.67             
1988 26,484,593.67             
1989 61,877,064.67             
1990 119,334,089.00           
1991 153,224,861.33           
1992 155,429,744.00           
1993 133,529,210.67           
1994 106,578,152.33           
1995 75,407,081.00             
1996 41,773,255.33             
1997 78,315,310.00             
1998 121,034,263.67           
1999 269,972,901.67           
2000 778,884,263.00           
2001 845,188,033.33           
2002 932,436,506.67           
2003 682,222,387.67           
2004 837,032,079.00           
2005 890,917,595.33           
2006 1,088,919,660.67        
2007 963,872,860.00           
2008 947,433,385.67           
2009 777,356,134.67           
2010 933,240,135.00           
2011 800,286,605.67           
2012 722,297,094.00           
2013 505,890,382.00           
2014 557,909,690.33           
2015 596,285,358.00           
2016 618,552,199.67           
2017 599,124,242.33           
2018 539,088,719.00           
2019 626,308,310.67           




show whether the years of Plan Colombia indicate that Plan Colombia may have impacted or 
influenced changes in displacement and palm oil hectarage. A Tukey Test would have provided 
the exact differences between the means of each time period, but it requires equal 
observations across the groups, which were not available for this dataset.   
Results 
USAID 
 Though USAID investment in Colombia existed prior to Plan Colombia the 
implementation of the program greatly increased annual disbursements over time (Figure 1, 
Figure 2). Between just 2000 and 2006, USAID under Plan Colombia exceeded $6.9 billion USD, 
a drastic change from the $1.7 billion invested from 1985 to 1999 (Table 3). The trend of higher 
disbursements continues after 2006, with over $8.8 billion USD invested through 201919. This 
supports that Plan Colombia not only increased United States investment in Colombia, but also 
that it set a precedent for additional funding and a closer financial relationship between the 
two countries.   
 
19 $1 U.S. in 1985 equaled $1.60 U.S. in 2000 and $2.46 in 2019. These are increases of 60% and 238% 
respectively. USAID expenditures increased approximately 2900% from 1985 to 2000 and 2042% from 







Figure 1. USAID Investment (USD) 1985-2019 
 
 

























































USAID Investment in Colombia
Pre-Plan (1985-1999) Plan Colombia (2000-2006) Post-Plan (2007-2019)
24,880,769.00           1,684,925,135.00                           460,958,881.00                
25,323,190.00           371,670,209.00                               853,052,302.00                
26,384,846.00           740,714,176.00                               1,018,057,221.00           
27,745,745.00           934,282,778.00                               928,610,882.00                
131,500,603.00         836,099,283.00                               454,191,714.00                
198,755,919.00               902,370,725.00                               784,088,686.00                
129,418,062.00               1,528,288,974.00                           279,390,746.00                
138,115,251.00               610,249,639.00                
133,054,319.00               899,215,689.00                
48,564,887.00                  346,191,271.00          
44,602,037.00                  551,965,767.00          
32,152,842.00                  526,211,671.00          
158,191,051.00               800,747,494.00          
172,758,898.00               345,118,417.00          
478,968,756.00               






Figure 2. 3-Year Averages, USAID Investment (USD) Over Time 
 
 
Table 4. 3-Year Average USAID Investment (USD) Pre-Plan Colombia, During Plan Colombia, and Post-Plan Colombia 
The single factor ANOVA for USAID and the 3-year averages show that there are 













































































3 Year Avg. USAID (USD)
Pre-Plan (1985-1999) Plan Colombia (2000-2006) Post-Plan (2007-2019)
25,529,601.67           778,884,263.00                    963,872,860.00          
26,484,593.67           845,188,033.33                    947,433,385.67          
61,877,064.67           932,436,506.67                    777,356,134.67          
119,334,089.00         682,222,387.67                    933,240,135.00          
153,224,861.33         837,032,079.00                    800,286,605.67          
155,429,744.00         890,917,595.33                    722,297,094.00          
133,529,210.67         1,088,919,660.67                 505,890,382.00          
106,578,152.33         557,909,690.33          
75,407,081.00           596,285,358.00          
41,773,255.33           618,552,199.67          
78,315,310.00           599,124,242.33          
121,034,263.67         539,088,719.00          
269,972,901.67         626,308,310.67          
557,359,194.00          
Total 1,368,490,129.00      6,055,600,525.67                 9,745,004,311.00       




confidence level of 0.05, with p-values of 2.6006E-08 and 7.6147E-15, respectively (Table 5, 
Table 6). 
 
Table 5. USAID Single Factor ANOVA, alpha = 0.05 
 
Table 6. USAID 3-Year Avg. Single Factor ANOVA, alpha = 0.05 
Palm Oil 
Though palm oil plantations have existed in Colombia for decades, hectarage began to 
increase faster during Plan Colombia. This is the case in the data for both Fedepalma and 
Agronet (Figure 3), despite Agronet reporting lower numbers. Note that the data from 
Fedepalma includes plantations in development in addition to those already established.  
 
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Pre-Plan (1985-1999) 15 1770417175 118027812 1.384E+16
During Plan (2000-2006) 7 6998351280 999764469 2.0849E+17
Post-Plan (2007-2019) 14 8858050380 632717884 5.9704E+16
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 4.17962E+18 2 2.0898E+18 31.0527878 2.6006E-08 3.28491765
Within Groups 2.22086E+18 33 6.7299E+16
Total 6.40048E+18 35
SUMMARY: USAID
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Pre-Plan (1985-1999) 13 1368490129 105268471 4.4407E+15
During Plan (2000-2006) 7 6055600526 865085789 1.6226E+16
Post-Plan (2007-2019) 14 9745004311 696071737 2.6052E+16
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 3.49596E+18 2 1.748E+18 110.738937 7.6146E-15 3.30481725
Within Groups 4.89325E+17 31 1.5785E+16
Total 3.98528E+18 33





Figure 3. Palm oil hectarage 1987-2019 (Fedepalma, 2016; Agronet, 2017) 
 
Table 7. Palm oil hectarage (current and in development) pre-Plan Colombia (1987-1999), during Plan Colombia (2000-2006), 



















































































Palm Oil (established + in development) (ha) FEDEPALMA Palm Oil (established + in development) (ha) MinAg
Pre-Plan Colombia Plan Colombia Post-Plan Colombia
78,396                            158,019                307,482                           
94,412                            175,455                325,327                           
103,396                         194,431                352,004                           
                          111,380 211,265                379,611                           
116,694                         229,199                405,656                           
120,942                         259,751                426,795                           
123,070                         291,831                456,419                           
125,856                         470,219                           
130,400                         487,748                           
135,459                         505,966                           
134,648                         523,458                           
144,589                         
150,851                         






Table 8. Palm oil hectarage pre-Plan Colombia (1987-1999), during Plan Colombia (2000-2006), and post-Plan Colombia (2007-
2017) (Agronet, 2017) 
 The single factor ANOVA for palm oil hectarage, as reported by both Agronet and 
Fedepalma, showed a significant difference between the means of each period at a 0.05 level of 
confidence. The p-values for Fedepalma and Agronet were 9.043E-14 and 3.205E-09, 
respectively (Table 9, Table 10).  
 
Table 9. Fedepalma Single Factor ANOVA, alpha = 0.05 
Pre-Plan Colombia Plan Colombia Post-Plan Colombia
51,560                            147,439                221,601                           
62,870                            154,331                246,586                           
76,135                            155,208                258,907                           
                             89,671 167,361                284,241                           
97,604                            180,227                334,416                           
108,510                         192,970                344,643                           
113,395                         208,875                379,966                           
125,321                         430,634                           
131,067                         479,663                           
133,688                         498,962                           
145,134                         528,351                           
147,493                         
148,644                         
Total 1,431,092             1,206,411       4,007,970              
Agronet (ha)
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Pre-Plan Colombia 13 1570093 120776.3846 408453505.8
Plan Colombia 7 1519951 217135.8571 2220501389
Post-Plan Colombia 11 4640685 421880.4545 5462282369
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 5.496E+11 2 2.74802E+11 105.6244562 9.043E-14 5.45293692







Table 10. Agronet Single Factor ANOVA, alpha = 0.05 
Displacement 
 Annual displacement, specifically the numbers of people expelled and received, as 
declared as reported by the Unidad Para Las Víctimas (2020) exponentially increased beginning 
in 1999 and continued at higher rates during Plan Colombia. After 2006, these numbers 
decreased considerably (Figure 4). 
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Pre-Plan Colombia 13 1431092 110084 1061420566
Plan Colombia 7 1206411 172344.4286 514214584
Post-Plan Colombia 11 4007970 364360.9091 11601695835
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 4.0122E+11 2 2.00608E+11 42.60502443 3.205E-09 5.45293692







Figure 4. Annual Displacement: # of people expelled, received, and declared (Unidad Para Las Víctimas, 2020) 
 According to the data provided by Unidad Para Las Víctimas (2020), the estimated 
numbers of people expelled and received across the country skyrocketed at the start of Plan 
Colombia and more than doubled during Plan Colombia, when compared to previous years. 
Both remained at higher rates in subsequent years (Figure 4, Table 11, Table 12). Conversely, 
while the number of declared victims dramatically increased during Plan Colombia, it soared to 






























































































Table 11. Number of people expelled pre-Plan Colombia, during Plan Colombia, and post-Plan Colombia (Unidad Para Las 
Víctimas, 2020) 
 
Table 12. Number of people received pre-Plan Colombia, during Plan Colombia, and post-Plan Colombia (Unidad Para Las 
Víctimas, 2020) 
  
















Total 1,378,209 3,888,497 2,967,589
# Expelled






















Table 13. Number of people declared pre-Plan Colombia, during Plan Colombia, and post-Plan Colombia (Unidad Para Las 
Víctimas, 2020) 
 Last, the single factor ANOVA for each of the three displacement variables showed 
significant differences between the means of estimates pre-Plan Colombia, during Plan 
Colombia, and post-Plan Colombia at a 0.05 level of confidence. The p-values for the number of 
expelled and received people were 1.3894E-09 and 1.03E-09, respectively (Table 14, Table 15). 
The p-value for the number of declared victims of displacement was 3.9932E-08 (Table 16). 
 






















Table 14. Single Factor ANOVA: # of people Expelled (Unidad Para Las Víctimas, 2020) 
 
Table 15. Single Factor ANOVA: # of people Received (Unidad Para Las Víctimas, 2020) 
 
Table 16. Single Factor ANOVA: # of people Declared (Unidad Para Las Víctimas, 2020) 
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Pre-Plan (1985-1999) 15 1378209 91880.6 8858507306
During Plan (2000-2006) 7 3888497 555499.5714 1.6656E+10
Post-Plan (2007-2019) 13 2967589 228276.0769 1.4537E+10
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 1.02687E+12 2 5.13436E+11 41.2392631 1.3894E-09 3.29453682
Within Groups 3.98406E+11 32 12450180557
Total 1.42528E+12 34
SUMMARY: # of People Expelled
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Pre-Plan (1985-1999) 15 1166120 77741.33333 6679202167
During Plan (2000-2006) 7 3793802 541971.7143 1.4527E+10
Post-Plan (2007-2019) 13 2959640 227664.6154 1.7351E+10
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 1.02861E+12 2 5.14305E+11 42.3200455 1.03E-09 3.29453682
Within Groups 3.88888E+11 32 12152748778
Total 1.4175E+12 34
SUMMARY: # of People Received
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Pre-Plan (1985-1999) 15 133070 8871.333333 392022321
During Plan (2000-2006) 7 2539645 362806.4286 9302438923
Post-Plan (2007-2019) 13 5584732 429594.7692 5.5133E+10
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 1.3736E+12 2 6.86798E+11 30.4021072 3.9932E-08 3.29453682
Within Groups 7.22895E+11 32 22590482248
Total 2.09649E+12 34




 The One-way ANOVA results align with the plots over time. Therefore, Plan Colombia 
significantly influenced the financial relationship between the United States and Colombia. 
USAID investment was lower and significantly different prior to the program’s implementation 
and continued to increase after the program’s end. Palm oil hectarage and displacement were 
both significantly different across each period, and drastically increased during Plan Colombia. 
The continuing trends post-Plan Colombia indicate that the program did in fact have an 
important impact which continues to influence the political and economic relationship between 
the two countries. 
Discussion 
While most research regarding the impacts of palm oil focuses on environmental 
degradation and market-based campaigns to promote sustainability discourse, it is important to 
assess the ways in which government-supported violence, especially as part of United States-
supported efforts to combat the illegal drug trade, create space for expanding plantations 
which in turn exacerbate tensions over land and resources. Current events are paving the way 
for new conversations regarding the connections between palm oil, USAID and United States 
interventions, and armed conflict.  
Plan Colombia was initially a six-year program, but it established a closer relationship 
between Colombia and the United States which still exists today. Trends after 2006 correspond 
with the ongoing relationship between the United States and Colombia, with Plan Colombia 
laying a foundation for new initiatives and recommendations by the U.S. government. Colombia 




in which the guerrillas agreed to demobilize and forfeit their arms to the United Nations in 2016 
(Office of the Press Secretary, 2016). Other stipulations include the Colombian government 
agreeing to not extradite FARC leaders to the United States to face punishment for their crimes. 
United States government officials have referred to Plan Colombia as a point of pride for laying 
the foundation for this agreement while also allowed for the continued cooperation between 
the two nations (Corker et. al, 2017). In a hearing before the Subcommittee on Western 
Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global 
Women’s Issues under the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 
Senator Marco Rubio stated 
 
The result of it is the Colombian military is now the best armed and trained in Latin 
America. It is a reliable security partner for the United States. It is also exporting its 
expertise to help build the capacity and the capability of other countries in the region, 
particularly in Central America (Corker et. al, 2017). 
 
 Rubio credits Colombia’s latest peace process, which began in 2012, to Plan Colombia’s 
“success.” In another subcommittee hearing under the Committee of Foreign Affairs, 
Congressman Jeff Duncan urged Colombia to overturn the decision to end aerial crop spraying 
methods and to not extradite FARC leaders to the United States because they threatened to 





We stand with you in your pursuit of peace, but do not give up the military successes we 
have achieved together at the negotiating table (Royce et. al, 2015) 
 
Efforts made have been repeatedly applauded by the United States government, as 
noted in these subcommittee hearings from the Committees of Foreign Affairs and Foreign 
Relations. It is no secret that the FARC is the largest of the guerrilla organizations fighting in the 
ongoing conflict, but this apparent scapegoating tactic completely removes acts of terror and 
human rights violations committed by right-wing paramilitaries, which may only be mentioned 
once or twice in hearings (Royce et. al, 2015; Corker et. al, 2017). In fact, the disregard for 
paramilitarism extended to declarations that it ended altogether, courtesy of former President 
Uribe stating that only guerrillas and narcotraffickers remained in Colombia after Plan Colombia 
(Maher & Thomson, 2011).  
 
USAID and the Peace Process- Has it worked? 
 To complement the peace agreement, the Obama and Manuel Santos administrations 
negotiated various aid packages to be sent to Colombia to support a new initiative called Peace 
Colombia, requesting $390 million to $450 million USD (Office of the Press Secretary, 2016), 
which includes the Economic Support Funds (ESF) program through USAID for $187.3 million 
USD (Isacson, 2016). The Washington Office on Latin America reported that ESF  
would support the Colombian government’s “Territorial Peace” efforts to establish a 
state presence in historically abandoned parts of the country, as well as programs for 




programs like these are necessary for Colombia’s post-conflict success, ESF would only 
increase by US$46 million over 2016 levels, to a total that is lower than this account was 
in 2008-2010. The ESF component of the aid package is, frankly, too low (Isacson, 2016). 
 Since embarking on this journey, however, other armed groups have occupied space 
abandoned by those who laid down their arms, followed by former combatants taking up arms 
once again. Dispossession is still used as a method of gaining control over land, especially by 
paramilitaries (Maher & Thompson, 2018). Upticks in violence show that the armed conflict is 
far from over. News reports in 2019 outline the ways in which the peace agreement has failed, 
attributing much of this to the failure of the state to uphold promises and agreed upon 
stipulations, such as subsidies and access to critical resources in neglected rural areas to 
support education and wellbeing (Casey, 2019; Grattan, 2020). On the other hand, reports also 
state that the FARC have also failed to meet terms of the agreement, including turning over 
assets by a given deadline (Bocanegra, 2020).  
 Regardless, the conflict continues. Demobilized personnel, human rights leaders, and 
civilians have been threatened, assassinated, and killed, while armed groups excluded from the 
agreement establish themselves in areas previously controlled by the FARC (Maher & 
Thompson, 2018; Casey, 2019; Grattan, 2020, Bocanegra, 2020; Cano, 2021; Rueda, 2021a; 
Rueda, 2021b; WOLA, 2021). Buenaventura, the largest port city in the country for example, 
gained international media attention for the significant uptick in homicides and intensified 
presence of illegal armed groups in the past few months. Displaced and Afrodescendant 
Colombians have been subjected to terror tactics and additional internal displacement in 




WOLA, 2021). Counter-narcotics efforts also continue to fail. With the current administration 
still failing to support historically neglected communities, farmers without the capital to 
cultivate legal crops have returned to coca production (Casey, 2019). 
A critical part of this peace process is the truth commission, or the Comisión de la 
Verdad, which was established in accordance with the 2017 Presidential Decree 588 (Laing, 
2018; Comisión de la Verdad, 2020). In a 2018 state address, President Duque declared a 
commitment to victims and investing a considerable budget into reparations (Presidencia de la 
República, 2019). The Decree’s mandate charged the Comisión to establish an official space to 
officially recognize human rights violations and impacts of armed conflict including effects on 
society and the democratic process, paramilitarism, the connection between illicit crops and 
conflict, and factors contributing to the persistence of violence, among others (Comisión, 2020). 
Since its inception following the signing of the signed 2016 peace agreement with the FARC, the 
Comisión has collected testimonies in various formats from ex-combatants, leaders, and 
victims, particularly women and marginalized groups (Comisión, 2020; Romero, 2020). Critical 
stories have come to light, including admissions of racially charged attacks from leaders of the 
AUC and FARC, testifying that they did target Afro-descendant, Raizal, and Palenquera 
communities, whom are members of the African Diaspora in Colombia (Aristizábal, 2020). 
Additionally, they have updated reports of current incidents of violence (Colprensa, 2020; 
Comisión, 2020; Romero, 2020). 
Now, United States President Joe Biden is collaborating with President Duque to 
continue close collaboration between Colombia and the United States (Suesca, 2021). In a 




Carson were congratulatory towards Colombia’s lower rates of homicide in the last 20 years 
and expressed hopes of “[strengthening the] bilateral partnership with Colombia” (Atlantic 
Council, 2021). Consistent with sentiments expressed in hearing, Biden has supported the 
reintroduction of aerial crop spraying, to which Duque has agreed (Hernandez & Payares-
Montoya, 2020; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2021).  
Overall, violence in Colombia continues and United States foreign aid only serves to 
support harmful policing, illegal paramilitaries, and other detrimental measures such as aerial 
spraying programs. At the time of finalizing this thesis in May 2021, Colombia is in the midst of 
nationwide protests over President Duque’s withdrawal of critical tax reform. Protestors are 
being met with extreme violence from national police and military forces in addition to severe 
internet censorship (Daniels, 2021; Nugent, 2021; Pozzebon, 2021.; Sesin, 2021; Tucker, 2021). 
State responses to protests clearly show the disregard for citizens’ lives and wellbeing, which 
aligns with state and military actions throughout periods of ongoing conflict.   
 
Case for Additional Research 
My hope is that future projects will explore these connections together and in more 
specific and regional contexts because it is important to understand the history of the conflict 
and the relationship that the United states has with Colombia. Culture, identity, and food vary 
drastically across the different regions in Colombia, which means that the experience of terror 
and displacement is tied to place as well, and it would be a disservice to only discuss these 




I want to highlight the effects of Plan Colombia on Montes de Maria region of Colombia 
(Figure 5) because it is a unique region because of its ecological diversity and because it is home 
to large Afro-descendant and Indigenous communities- these characteristics which make it 
particularly vulnerable to the types of external forces I have described. 
 
Figure 5. Map of Montes de María Region of Colombia (WOLA, 2012) 
From an ecological standpoint, the region is significant because of its biodiversity. 
Considered an “agricultural food pantry” (Avila et al., 2017), the area is the site of cultivation 
for many varieties of crops that are central to the country’s cuisine (Avila et al., 2017). This 
landscape has drawn significant attention from transnational corporations (TNCs) due to its 
fertility and abundance of underground resources. As such, it has shifted to become the 




wing, government-supported paramilitary forces assisting in the eviction of peoples. In their 
review of the business in Colombia, Hurtado Lozano et. al (2017) state: 
The reduced costs of this agribusiness attracted the presence of illegal armed actors. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, guerrilla organizations became untraceable entrepreneurs 
of extortion and kidnappings. However, in 2000 the paramilitary groups imposed their 
political and military power in flat areas where palm and banana plantations existed, 
and cattle grazed. They also “taxed” local populations for their provision of security 
(protection money): a practice made possible by the weak presence of government 
institutions (Hurtado Lozano et. al, 2017: 450). 
The expansion of oil palm plantations, as would be expected, has begun to affect food 
production in the region, since the monocultures currently represent 47.1% of the total 
cultivated land (Avila et al., 2017). As a result, many varieties of nutritional keystone crops, 
which are responsible for providing most nutritional requirements for those living in the region, 
have begun to disappear from local markets (Avila et al., 2017). According to the Department of 
Social Prosperity and World Food Program’s food insecurity mapping system, over 73 percent 
of municipalities in the department of Bolivar are at high risk of food insecurity. This is largely 
due to the replacement of such food crops in favor of oil palm (Avila et al., 2017). I argue that 
this is a key area to focus research, as the loss of keystone crops at the center of national and 
regional foodways is not only a critical loss of biodiversity, but also a loss of cultural and 





While much of the literature draws connections between palm oil and violence, Plan 
Colombia and palm oil, and armed conflict and USAID investment, my results help to draw each 
of these arguments together. Single factor ANOVA results suggest that, because there is a 
significant difference in the means of all variables before, during, and after Plan Colombia’s 
implementation, the USAID program helped to facilitate the expansion of palm oil plantations 
and increased displacement.  In short, the rapid expansion of palm oil hectarage alongside 
increased violence and Plan Colombia was not coincidental. United States foreign aid allegedly 
aimed at diminishing the drug trade ultimately provided funds for increased policing via the 
national army and police force, as well as indirect funding for the paramilitary forces operating 
alongside them and helped to violently clear people from their lands. Moreover, these newly 
“abandoned” lands became prime targets for oil palm plantations, which began to grow rapidly 
while displacement soared during Plan Colombia.  
The testimonials gathered through the Comisión de la Verdad and current trials for 
those answering for their crimes are creating the opportunity for a new era of accountability 
and recognition for acts of terror. This thesis hopes to contribute to this new vein of the 
conversation regarding armed conflict in Colombia by highlighting the connections between 
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